SINCE their June 2014 capture of the Iraqi city of Mosul, Islamic State (IS) forces have fought numerous battles along a shifting front line, which spans Iraqi and Syrian territory, and have engaged nearly every armed force there. Despite suffering territorial losses in 2014–15, the group continues to hold significant ground in Iraq and Syria. Since July 2014, Conflict Armament Research (CAR), an independent organisation mandated by the European Union to investigate the supply of weapons into armed conflicts, has worked in concert with Iraqi and Syrian forces to document materiel recovered in military action against IS forces. These partners include: the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units, the Iraqi Federal Police, the Kurdistan Region Security Council, the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and the Military Council of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria. CAR documented the components presented in this report following their recovery during major battles around the Iraqi towns of al Rabia, Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tikrit and the Syrian town of Kobane.
IS forces have manufactured and deployed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) across the battlefield on a quasi-industrial scale. Responsible for a large number of civilian and military casualties, these improvised bombs endanger and significantly delay ground operations against IS positions, while threatening the safe return of displaced populations. Made of components that are cheap and readily available, IEDs have become IS forces’ signature weapon. Their chains of supply differ from those of military weapons. Indeed, for the most part, IED components are commercial goods that are not subject to government export licenses and whose transfer is far less scrutinised and regulated than the transfer of weapons.
Conflict Armament Research Tracing the supply of components used in Islamic State IEDs over a period of 20 months, from July 2014 to February 2016, sent investigation teams in Iraq and Syria, examined more than 700 components used by IS forces to manufacture IEDs, identified their provenance, and traced their chains of custody. While this report focuses on the origin of supplies captured from IS forces, there is no evidence to suggest, nor does CAR in any respect imply, any direct transfer of goods to IS forces by the countries and companies mentioned in this report. CAR’s investigations map out the legal trade in component parts across the region. In all identified cases, producers have lawfully traded components with regional trade and distribution companies. These companies, in turn, have sold them to smaller commercial entities. By allowing individuals and groups affiliated with IS forces to acquire components used in IEDs, these small entities appear to be the weakest link in the chain of custody. A focus on lawfully traded commodities is thus critically important to an understanding of how IS forces fuel their large-scale manufacture of IEDs. Many components that can be used in the manufacture of homemade explosives, such as aluminium paste and urea, are not subject to transfer controls, including export licensing. As such, their supply within the region is largely unregulated and weakly monitored. Other components, such as detonators and detonating cord, are subject to export licensing, but are also commonly used in commercial activities, such as mining and industry. Licensing alone has not been sufficient to prevent acquisition by IS forces. Ostensibly civilian components, such as mobile telephones and telecommunications cable, are also investigated in this report because their supply serves as a ‘marker’ for understanding the acquisition networks used by IS forces.
Unsurprisingly, IS acquisition networks draw most heavily on lawful commerce in the countries that border their territory. Proximity is a major reason why the goods traded by Iraqi and Turkish companies appear throughout the supply chains of components that IS forces use to manufacture IEDs. Both Iraq and Turkey have large agricultural and mining sectors, in which many such chemicals and explosive components are employed extensively. At the same time, many small-scale commercial enterprises appear to have sold, whether wittingly or unwittingly, components to parties linked to, or employed by, IS forces. Perhaps the most significant finding of this report concerns the speed with which IS forces have been able to acquire IED components.....
Table 1 of the Report gives the list of the countries and Companies who provide them. It includes India. Detonating cord Solar Industries India, Detonating cord and detonators Premier Explosives India, Detonating cord and detonators Rajasthan, Explosives and Chemicals India Safety fuse, Chamundi Explosives India, Detonators Economic Explosives India, Detonators IDEAL Industrial Explosives India are the Indian companies providing materials to ISIS among others from a number of countries.
Though Modi government is claiming to fight terrorism, under its nose Indian companies are providing materials for ISIS to spread its terrorist actions! This heinous act should be condemned. The democratic forces should demand that the Modi government take action against these companies and stop their supply line.
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